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erwin Straus’ aesthesiological analysis of the voice-hearing modality can serve as a 
bridge between top-down models, which emphasize the emotional and inter-subjective 
significance of auditory hallucinations, and bottom-up models, which highlight the 
dysfunctional neurobiological mechanisms that cause them. The comparison with Crow’s 
hypothesis allows to include the aesthesiological approach in an anthropo-biological 
context in which schizophrenia appears to be the price that species Sapiens had to pay to 
acquire self-consciousness.
“SENSING” VoICES. A THEORETICAL 
COMPARISON BETWEEN THE AESTHESIOLOGICAL 
APPROACH TO SCHIzOPHRENIA AND SOME 
CONTEMPORARY PHENOMENOLOGICAL  
AND NEUROPSYCHIATRIC MODELS
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according to Straus, aesthesiology has the task of providing an analysis of 
aisthesis devoid of the intellectualistic prejudices that still dominate Kant’s 
aesthetic, restoring the sense of which it was deprived in the modern era by 
galilean and cartesian epistemology, science and philosophy (Straus 1949, 
240). if for descartes sensations are in fact a defective way of knowing 
which must be analytically led back to the clear and distinct ideas of 
cogito, for Kant they are a sort of chaotic and atomized dust of stimuli, 
passively received by sensitivity, awaiting the action of synthetic and 
unifying schemes, categories and principles of the imagination and the 
intellect to receive a formal sense. the aesthesiological analysis of sensing 
shows instead that sensory modalities express in different ways a unitary 
structure of meaning that shapes every single act of sensing (Straus 1935, 
101), giving it embodied legality – at the same time a priori and material – 
which, in our opinion, can be summed up in three key principles.
First, we have to acknowledge a fundamental fact, disowned by most 
philosophers and scientists: sensory experiencing [Empfinden] is not a form of 
representation of reality among others, but the only means of access to reality which 
a living being provided with motility, be it man or animal, is equipped with. For a 
sensing and self-moving living creature, only what is or can become the 
object of sensing is real. recognizing that fact does not mean being dissolved 
in perceiving, but understanding that every other cognitive, language or 
imaginative act – be it belief, judgment, or mathematicizing abstraction – is 
eventually forced to return to the activity of sensing if it wants to establish 
some relationships with reality. in other words, between the act of sensing 
and other intentional acts, there is an ontological difference – similar to the 
one existing between the landscape and the map that would represent it – 
that gives the act of sensing inescapable primacy (Straus 1949, 241; Straus 
1935, 379).
Secondly, we must acknowledge that the activity of sensing has a character of 
intentionality which is disavowed by those like husserl who situate the active source 
of each donation and constitution of “sense” in a solitary consciousness, separated 
from the world and from every other consciousness (Straus 1935, 12, 210). these 
doctrines do not take into account the fact that the sense-bestowing 
consciousness – self-sufficient in its reflexive withdrawal into itself –  is not 








a starting point, but a point of arrival for philosophical analysis: a historical 
construct, conveyed by the language of tradition, which has to be critically 
deconstructed in its residual spatial metaphoricity (interior / exterior; 
content / container), by reason of the impasses that it produces at the level 
of the process of self-understanding of the human and, more particularly, 
at the level of understanding of psychiatric disorders that distort the 
individual’s relationship with reality.
according to Straus, the primary consciousness is that which occurs in the 
sensory relationship with reality: a pathic-communicative relation, which 
man shares with all other moving animals, characterized by unavoidable 
emotional valence – attractive or repulsive, painful or pleasant, suffered 
passively or actively produced by the contact with the world – and 
characterized by such a reciprocal communication that, in any act of 
sensing, i am at the same time aware of myself in relation to the otherness 
of the world, and of the otherness of the world in relation to me (Straus 1949: 
262). a relationship of mutual interpenetration between the whole and the 
part that varies with the moving prospects, bodily located and by motility 
dynamized, which my senses open up – in a continuous flow of views and 
adumbrations, actual and potential viewpoints, movements and advances – 
in the unitary horizon of the world. this intentional structure, which is closely 
associated with motility, is given by Straus the name, not free from doubt, 
of i-and-the-Other or i-and-the-World. a structural concept that retranslates 
into prelinguistic and embodied terms, extended to the sphere of animality, 
heidegger’s phenomenological concept of being-in-the-world: a concept 
regarded by Straus as too human and culturalized (Straus 1963).
The problem of the unity and multiplicity of the senses arises within this unitary 
and at the same time variable structure, actual and at the same time 
potential, spatial and temporal (Straus 1935: 212, 395; Straus 1945: 245). 
each sensory modality articulates the primary structure of sensing according to 
its peculiar form and laws, while the intentional structure of the whole remains 
unchanged. These specific forms and legality are defined in relation to the 
way in which in each sensory modality the emotional and communicative, 
active and passive, spatial and temporal components belonging to the 
fundamental structure that puts each living being in relationship with 
reality, combine and hierarchically arrange themselves. therefore, the 
different sensory modalities become part of an almost circular sensory 
spectrum in which the two extremes are represented by the dual nature 
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of touch: haptic sense, exploratory and digital, on the one hand – the most 
active and intelligent of the senses according to aristotle – and passive, 
epidermic touch, on the other hand, the most atavistic and primordial sense, 
common to every animal form, which exposes us directly to the immediate, 
painful and invasive contact with the world. being a predominantly 
analytical and active sense, which allows us to stabilize reality on the basis 
of spatial relations, repeatable and variable in a coordinated and regular 
way, sight allows us to hold off the world by controlling its multiplicity 
and becoming, while taste and smell convey physiognomic characters which 
give an immediate repulsive or attractive valence to reality. because of its 
inability to offer any resistance to sounds that seem to invade us cancelling 
any distance between us and the world, hearing is positioned, according to 
Straus, in a place that is diametrically opposed to sight. being a synthetic 
sense that informs us of the time and rhythm of the world and of the 
occurrence of the event, hearing is permanently exposed to the encircling 
and overwhelming power of the Other – either the power of the natural 
world, allon, or the power of the interpersonal world, heteros (Straus 1963). 
according to Straus, the ones that succumb to this overwhelming power 
are those who hear atmospheric voices that come from all sides and break 
any distinction between the inside and the outside, between what is mine 
and what belongs to the Other, disrupting the whole structural relationship 
which governs the relationship between the i-and-the-world (Straus 1935, 
382; Straus 1945, 257). but how can we explain, in its phenomenological 
characteristics, this specific syndrome that radically distorts the 
transcendental apperception of the self and the sense of belonging to the 
self for our acts of consciousness?
In contemporary scientific debate, the analysis of the schizophrenic 
syndrome developed by thomas, leudar and co-workers seems to agree 
in many points with Straus’s methodological approach (leudar & thomas 
2000; thomas, bracken & leudar 2004). the starting point of these authors 
is the need to be at the source of any separation between the psychological 
and neurophysiological. this separation is vitiated by epistemological 
and ontological bias of cartesian origin, inadvertently affecting also 
neuroscience and cognitive approaches that claim to overcome the 
cartesian dualism by reducing the language of psychology to the one of 
natural sciences or establishing an analogy between mental processes 
and the algorithms of a computer. in fact, what remains the basis of all these 
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distinction which, in our opinion, no one has criticized more radically than 
Straus. the outer world and the inner world are for Straus only secondary, 
linguistic and metaphorical constructions, produced from a primary and 
incontrovertible ground: the territory of sensing. this aesthesiological region 
can be represented as a surface without distinction between inside and 
outside and without thickness, as a sort of möbius ring folded back on itself, 
from which – through sensory-motor assembling which comes to form the 
eccentric and excarnated scaffold (Straus 1965) of philosophical and scientific 
language – the myth of a solitary inner space separated from the outside 
world is historically and culturally built. 
according to thomas, bracken and leudar, in order to overcome this 
separation, it is first necessary to develop a new philosophical framework 
which is able to provide psychiatric practice with a new phenomenology of 
schizophrenia. current phenomenology, inherited from Jaspers, is vitiated 
by an undue separation between inner consciousness and the outer world, of 
husserl’s epistemological source, which must be replaced by an ontological 
phenomenology, rooted in heidegger’s and merlau-Ponty’s thought, centered 
on the concept of being-in-the-world. readapting in numerous articles and 
applications merleau-Ponty’s phantom limb analysis to the description 
of clinical cases of schizophrenic patients treated by them, thomas and 
colleagues show convincingly that the experience of hearing voices may 
acquire again the meaning that has been denied by cognitive and neuro-
scientific approach: a situational and embodied meaning where auditory 
hallucinations are closely linked to the patient’s biography, culture and 
religion, with the memories and emotions associated with his history and 
past, from which memories and emotions strongly re-emerge as a peculiar 
way of being-in-the-world and of being-with-others. these memories and 
emotions survive their past – for example, the death of her husband whose 
voice, sighs, and denigrating words Sue continues to hear – just as phantom 
limb survives its amputation as the possibility of haptic and kinesthetic 
relationship with the world sedimented in the body. according to the 
authors, this situational and embodied approach also allows to reinterpret 
the experience of hearing voices not only as a disorder, a deterioration 
or degeneration, but also from an ethical and autopoietic perspective, 
as a creative and quasi-intentional way to deal with one’s painful and 
fragmented experience of the world. individual and group techniques that 
allow the patient to alleviate the suffering produced by hearing voices are 
evidence of this ability to influence the course of their disease according 
“sensIng” voICes. a theoRetICaL CoMPaRIson
alberto gUalandi
137
to a top-down dynamic that cognitive and neuroscientific models are not 
yet able to explain (cockshutt 2004; Wykes 2004). but, recognizing the 
importance of the analysis of these authors, something fundamental is still 
unclear: why is this mode of being-in-the-world, peculiar to schizophrenia, 
expressed mainly in the form of hearing voices rather than that of tactile or 
visual hallucinations?
in our previous works, we compared two different theoretical 
applications of the concept of being-in-the-world to the problem of 
schizophrenia: binswanger’s top-down conception and Straus’s bottom-
up model. While the former provides the advantage of giving account of 
the historically, biographically and intersubjectively situated character 
of the disease, the latter offers the advantage of giving account of its 
embodied characters, and in particular the advantage to explain why 
the auditory modality is the one most concerned with schizophrenia. 
despite some ambiguities and uncertainties, well highlighted by 
binswanger in his critical reading of Straus’s work (binswanger 1936), 
Straus’s conception also seems to offer the advantage of providing 
some useful information to open a new theoretical perspective and to 
reconcile these two opposite conceptions of schizophrenia. in addition 
to developing an aesthesiological analysis of the auditory modality, 
Straus gave some information which helped to understand the uniquely 
sensorimotor loop implemented by the human phonatory-auditory 
system and the feedback/feed-forward process of hearing. according to 
Straus, in patients suffering from auditory hallucinations we can assume 
a delay or a shift-phase of the sensorimotor system – similar to that 
produced by a reverb or echo which sends back to our ears the sound 
produced by ourselves as if it came from the external environment 
– penetrated by the experience of auditory hallucinations. how can 
this happen? We must first remember that for Straus – and for the 
founders of aesthesiology gehlen and Plessner, from whom Straus partly 
drew inspiration – the inner dialogue that we call thought is nothing 
but language exonerated from the action of real sound production. 
therefore, the function of control carried out by our ears produces 
– for object relational psychoanalysts (mitchell 1988), but also for 
philosophers of language like ernst tugendhat (tugendhat 1976) – a kind 
of internalization/anticipation of the judgment of approval or denial 
affixed to our statements by communication partners we have been 
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system of hearing and voice would thus provide a plausible explanation 
for the hypothesis of schizophrenic syndrome in which the distorted 
relationship with the heteros would have the power to deform the very 
relationship with the allon. the phono-auditory modality would offer, in 
other words, the ability to operate a kind of mediation between the top-
down and the bottom-up conceptions of phenomenology and etiology of 
schizophrenia. 
this mediating conception seems to us partly in accordance with 
some recent models provided by neuropsychiatry. actually, the 
pathophysiological models trying to provide an explanation of auditory 
hallucinations through neuroimaging techniques follow a theoretical 
dissemination which, according to some authors, would express the 
variability and plurality of schizophrenic phenomenology (david 
2004). although many studies correlate the experience of auditory 
hallucinations with structural and functional abnormalities of the 
auditory cortex, and in particular with the areas responsible for the 
monitoring of internal or external sources of language production and 
perception, according to david, however, what is still unclear is the 
role played by specific brain areas and functions related to voluntary 
and involuntary memory, to the “excessive” auditory imagination, to 
“on-line self-monitoring” and to the appreciation and evaluation of the 
semantic content conveyed by what the voices say. according to Seal, 
aleman and mcguire (2004), it is possible and necessary to try to unify 
these different models into an integrated concept in which top-down 
and bottom-up processes converge towards a monitoring sound-auditory 
centre which – noting a considerable discrepancy between feed-forward 
mechanisms of vocal emission and feedback mechanisms of auditory 
recognition of the sound produced and perceived – would come into a 
kind of sensory-motor short circuit. being prepared by genetic factors, 
but also encouraged and amplified by factors associated with top-
down expectations, moods, evaluation attitudes, communicative and 
interpersonal distortions, delusional linguistic frameworks, this voice-
hearing short circuit would be the place, at the same time structural and 
functional, where according to Seal and his collaborators, the experience 
of auditory hallucinations starts.  




(Seal, aleman & mcguire 2004, 64).
retranslating this theory into the terms of Straus’s aesthesiology, it could 
be argued that “i”, allon and heteros short-circuit, fuse and surreptitiously 
exchange their roles of listener and speaker thanks to the transactional 
primary power – typical of the original condition of the infant and the 
child – of the only, complex and articulated, by man self-produced, sensory 
reality: the sound of his own voice.
according to other authors (hunter 2004; Jones & Fernyhough 2007), 
however, such a model would be unable to explain two things: how is it 
possible for the inner speech, which we identify with silent thought, to turn 
into really hearing voices? and why, in most cases, would these voices be 
perceived as coming from the outside world (although those that perceive 
them appear very frequently to be less able than normal subjects to locate 
the source of real sounds, especially if coming from the right side of the 
body)? in order to answer these questions we must complete, in our opinion, 
aesthesiology with a more explicit anthropology: theoretical connection 
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Plessner’s latest works. gehlen’s anthropobiology, in particular, provides a 
powerful theoretical model through which we can try to reconstruct the 
genesis of silent speech, which we call self-consciousness or reflection, from 
a process of progressive exemption of the senses and the body, performed 
by the voice-hearing system, which in turn is exonerated from the effective 
phonatory process, by means of the anticipatory and feedback function 
implemented by the auditory imagination alone (or, in terms of changeux, 
by means of the auditory pre-representation).
according to contemporary neurobiologists and paleoanthropologists, this 
process can be conceptualized as a complex and progressive succession of 
restructuring exaptations thanks to which anatomical, neurological and cognitive 
structures are completely or partly freed from previous functions – the hand 
from ambulation, the eye and the hand from the function of synesthetic 
exploration and identification of reality through the predicate and the 
name, hearing from the monitoring of the voice – and co-opted for new 
biological and cultural purposes not provided for by evolution (gould & vrba 1982; 
tattersall 1998; ramachandran 2003). these neuroanatomical exaptations 
converge on sensory-motor assembly, in part socially regulated and 
stabilized, which sometimes have an impact on the process of biological 
evolution, by means of sexual selection and culture. according to michael 
corballis (corballis 2002), this interaction between biological and cultural 
evolution would explain the progressive increase in brain lateralization 
which was produced (about 50,000 years ago) in correspondence with the 
technologically and linguistically crucial phases of the hominization 
process. and according to Julian Jaynes and timothy J. crow, the possible 
reversal of this process of evolutionary biological-cultural interaction 
would explain the breakdown, to which the schizophrenic patient is 
prone, in structures of consciousness prior to those made possible by 
the neurobiological process that allowed us to allocate the centers 
for production, anticipation and recognition of sound in a dominant 
hemisphere, dragging the entire sensorimotor structure of the body to the 
right: the so-called brain lateralization (Jaynes 1975; crow 1997; crow 2000; 
crow 2004).
it is not possible to reconstruct in detail here crow’s neuropsychiatric 
doctrine, which refers to marian annetts’s theory of brain lateralization 
(annett 1985; annett 1999), and to the theories formulated by chomsky and 
bühler concerning the indexical and propositional structure of language. 
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Suffice it to recall that it attempts to show that the persons who, for genetic 
reasons, are close to the indistinction point for cerebral lateralization risk 
the collapse of the quadripartite structures that regulate in a coordinated 
way the anticipation and perceptive recognition of the voice, and the 
anticipation and recognition of the semantic meaning conveyed by it. thus 
breaking up the deep indexical structure, which is the basis of language, 
according to crow the result is a deconstruction of the mechanism that 
indexes the roles of speaker and hearer of our voice and the voice of the 
other, through the allocation of deictic terms (i, you, here, there, now, 
before, after) to their content of consciousness (crow 2004).
but since, as descartes had already found, every judgment or proposition 
implicitly contains a metalinguistic proposition introduced by a deictic 
that reflexively clarifies the intention of the person who thinks or says this 
judgment – i say (here and now) that “the grass is green”, you doubted that i 
believed (there and before) that “it is right to do so”, etc. – what is disrupted 
by the collapse of the voice-hearing neurological mechanisms is the same 
recursive and metalinguistic structures that have made the phenomenon 
of self-consciousness possible. on the basis of this theory, we may conclude 
by saying that schizophrenia can be interpreted as the price that humanity 
continues to pay for having acquired, at the end of a long process of 
biological and cultural hominization, those sensorimotor montages – 
result of exaptation and exoneration – which allowed us to internalize the 
Other human being in the anticipating and recognizing mechanisms of 
hearing. a conclusion which agrees with the deepest meaning of Straus’s 
phenomenological anthropology (Straus 1960) and, in our opinion, casts 
new light on the dynamics and mechanisms that underlie normal and 
pathological human self-consciousness.
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